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Abstract
Adversarial examples are of wide concern due
to their impact on the reliability of contemporary
machine learning systems. Effective adversarial
examples are mostly found via white-box attacks.
However, in some cases they can be transferred
across models, thus enabling them to attack black-
box models. In this work we evaluate the transfer-
ability of three adversarial attacks - the Fast Gradi-
ent Sign Method, the Basic Iterative Method, and
the Carlini & Wagner method, across two classes
of models - the VGG class(using VGG16, VGG19
and an ensemble of VGG16 and VGG19), and the
Inception class(Inception V3, Xception, Incep-
tion Resnet V2, and an ensemble of the three).
We also outline the problems with the assessment
of transferability in the current body of research
and attempt to amend them by picking specific
”strong” parameters for the attacks, and by using a
L-Infinity clipping technique and the SSIM metric
for the final evaluation of the attack transferabil-
ity.
1. Introduction
Image classification is the task of assigning an image a
specific class based on the image contents. Convolutional
neural networks (CNNs) (LeCun et al., 1999) are state-
of-the-art neural networks widely used for this purpose.
However, neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial
examples(Szegedy et al., 2013).
Adversarial examples are inputs created with the
purpose of fooling a machine learning model. In the
context of image classification, this means distorting the
pixel values of an initially correctly classified image until
misclassification.
Adversarial examples pose challenging questions, such
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as how neural networks and humans differ in classifying
images. Adding noise to an image does not usually deceive
a human annotator, however, neural networks can be easily
fooled in many cases.
From a security perspective, adversarial examples
are a potential risk when introduced to a variety of machine
learning applications, such as self-driving cars, drone
control, facial and speech recognition systems and more.
For example, (Finlayson et al., 2018) elaborates on how
bad actors in the heavily funded healthcare sector are able
to take advantage of adversarial attacks for misdiagnoses,
leading to unnecessary and expensive medical procedures.
Adversarial images are created via adversarial at-
tacks. Adversarial attacks target a specific model, and look
to change the input of this model until misclassification. In
a ”white-box” setting, the attacker has access to the archi-
tecture and parameters of the model. Adding random noise
without taking advantage of the available knowledge of the
model will produce adversarial inputs of much lower quality.
Knowing the parameters and/or architecture of a
model, however, is not always possible. A malicious agent
attacking a web service, for example, will not typically
know the inner details of the algorithm employed by
the service. In this ”black-box” setting, the agent may
attempt to attack the service by running an adversarial
attack on either a custom local model, or on a publicly
available model, in a white-box way, and then sending the
adversarially created input over to the remote service. An
example of this is the attack on Clarifai.com (Liu et al.,
2016). The property of an adversarial example created by
one system with known architecture and parameters, to
transfer to another unknown black-box system, is called
transferability.
In this work we focus on the ”one-shot” black-box
transferability of adversarial attacks. By this we mean that
an attacker does not receive feedback from the black-box
system, and therefore cannot make any further modifica-
tions of the adversarial image depending on this feedback.
More specifically, we attempt to measure the transferability
of three different adversarial attacks for risk assessment
across five standard image classification models pre-trained
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on the ImageNet dataset: VGG16, VGG19, Inception
V3, Xception and Inception Resnet V2, and across two
ensembles. Do small differences in the model architecture
account for small differences in the transferability? Since
the models are well-known, highly-performant, free, and
publicly available, web services have an incentive to adapt
them to the services’ specific use-cases via transfer learning.
This could lead to overuse of the models in the public space
and motivates the choice of models explored in this work.
In the context of previous work, research has been
done on our explored standard models to evaluate the
effectiveness or transferability of adversarial attacks (Su
et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2016). However, this is usually done
only for single or multiple parameter settings of the attacks.
The parameters are usually chosen, so that the visual change
in the attacked images is imperceptible. This ”parameter
overfitting” may lead to unfair or inexhaustive comparisons
due to insufficient values of the parameters being tested
and the varying importances and roles of the parameters
used in the different algorithms. This gives motivation for
using a different way of assessing transferability(sec. 3)
and for further exploration into the problem of assessing
how attacks can be calibrated in order to draw consistent
and fair conclusions.
2. Background
2.1. Adversarial Attacks Frameworks
Two out-of-the-box adversarial attacks frameworks were
tested in this work. The versions of the frameworks with
the necessary modifications used for the experiments can be
found here1 and here2.
2.1.1. ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS TOOLBOX
The Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART) (Nicolae et al.,
2018) is a tool developed by IBM supporting various attack-
ing and defensive techniques, such as adversarial training,
defensive distillation (Papernot et al., 2015), and denoisers.
The library was used in its raw format for the experiments.
2.1.2. FOOLBOX
Foolbox is library which also implements a variety of at-
tacks such as informed noise attacks, gradient based attacks,
and attacks optimizing different norms. This package was
slightly modified for the experiment setup.
1https://github.com/deqncho2/foolbox
2https://github.com/deqncho2/art
2.2. Standard Image Classification Networks
The following models were the default Keras implementa-
tions pre-trained on the ImageNet dataset.
2.2.1. VGG FAMILY
The first evaluated family of models is the VGG family. The
VGG16 architecture was first introduced in (Simonyan &
Zisserman, 2014). For accurate classification, the networks
expect a RGB image to be preprocessed by flipping the R
and B dimensions and subtracting 103.939 from the blue,
116.779 from the green, and 123.68 from the red channel.
VGG16 The VGG16 implementation in Keras consists of
five blocks. The first two blocks use two consecutive convo-
lutional layers of filter size 3, and same padding. The last
three blocks have the same specifics, but use three convolu-
tions instead of two. The activation function is Relu. The
number of convolutional filters doubles each block. After
the convolutions there is a max pooling layer of size and
stride 2. At the end of the blocks there are two fully con-
nected layers with Relu activation of size 4096 and finally a
Softmax layer for the 1000 ImageNet categories.
The network has achieved 7.3% top-5 error rate on the 2014
ImageNet challenge.
VGG19 The VGG19 architecture has the same architec-
ture as VGG16, but instead of three, it has four convolutional
layers in the last three blocks. It allows for deeper feature
representations than VGG16, but does not yield much more
accurate results than VGG16 on the ImageNet challenge.
An ensemble of the two models was also evaluated against
the attacks.
Figure 1. VGG Ensemble
2.2.2. INCEPTION FAMILY
GoogLeNet, also known as Inception-V1 was first intro-
duced in 2014 (Szegedy et al., 2014) and exploited the idea
of an ”inception modules”(Lin et al., 2013). The inception
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modules are feature maps combining contexts of different
sizes to obtain different types of patterns, which removes the
need for manual selection of filter sizes and reduces com-
putational and memory cost via convolution dimensionality
reductions.
The GoogLeNet architecture combines these modules and
has 6.7% error rate on the 2014 ImageNet challenge and
outperforms VGG16 despite being a lot smaller(55 MB vs
490 MB).
The inception models’ preprocessing require the pixels of an
image to be divided by 255, subtracted by 2, and multiplied
by 2, so the original [0-255] pixel range is mapped to [-1-1].
Inception V3 Inception V2 and V3 were introduced in
the same paper(Szegedy et al., 2015). In it, several im-
provements were done to the original Inception architecture.
5x5 convolutions were factorized to two 3x3 convolutions,
which sped up computation. Furthermore, the authors found
that deeper representations lose information due to loss of
dimensions and thus information. Therefore, they made
the inception modules wider to keep the number of chan-
nels high. For version 3, RMSProp Optimizer and batch
normalization(Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015) were added, 7x7 con-
volutions were factorized, and label smoothing was done on
the class predictions to prevent the network from growing
too confident and to avoid overfitting.
Xception Xception was introduced in (Chollet, 2016) and
replaces the Inception network convolutions with depthwise
separable convolutions. It has roughly the same number of
parameters as Inception-V3, but slightly outperforms it on
the ImageNet dataset. It is based on the strong assumption
that spatial and depthwise correlations can be decoupled,
leading to the name of the network Xception (from ”Extreme
Inception”). After performing a 1x1 convolution on a feature
map, it uses n convolutional filters, where n is the number
of channels of the input, and each filter iterates only over
the specific channel, instead of using filters that iterate over
all channels. The network also makes use of residual blocks
and takes into account previous feature maps. Xception has
slightly smaller memory requirements than Inception V3.
Inception Resnet V2 Our final model is Inception Resnet
V2. It incorporates elements of Residual Networks (He et al.,
2015) into the Inception V4 architecture. It has the same
architecture as Inception Resnet V1 with the exception of
the ”stem”, but has different hyperparameter settings. Both
versions were introduced in the same paper (Szegedy et al.,
2016). Inception V4 and Inception Resnet V2 have similar
computational complexity despite the latter being deeper.
They both utilize reduction blocks which reduce the size of
the output, and Block A is the same in both architectures.
Inception V4 and Inception Resnet V2 also differ by the
Figure 2. Inception Ensemble.
types of modules they use. The Inception Resnet versions
incorporate residual connections in their modules.
For network stability, activation scaling is used for residual
layers deeper in the architecture.
Out of the three models, Inception Resnet V2 is the deepest
and the differs the most from the other two. It requires twice
the memory and computational operations as compared to
Inception V3. However, it outperforms Inception V3 on the
ILSVRC 2012 image classification benchmark with a top-5
accuracy of 95.3%(with 93.9% for Inception V3) and top-1
accuracy of 80.4%(compared to 78.0%).
Finally, as before, the concatenation of these models was
also evaluated by averaging their predictions(using the argu-
ment use logits = True in ART and predicts = ”logits”
in Foolbox).
2.3. Adversarial Attacks and Defense
Statistics were gathered for three attacks - the Fast Gradient
Sign Method, the Basic Iterative Method,and the Carlini
Wagner method.
Fast Gradient Sign Attack Method The Fast Gradient
Sign Method was first introduced in (Goodfellow et al.,
2015) and exploits the linear nature of neural networks. It is
an attack which adds noise to the original input by taking
the sign of the gradient of the loss function J of a trained
model with respect to the inputs, and adding it to the original
input. A distortion parameter  controls how much the input
is perturbed. The attack is defined by the equation:
xadv = x+  ∗ sign(∇xJ(x, ytrue))
where xadv is the calculated adversarial image, x is the
original image, ytrue is the true label of the image, and
∇xJ is the Jacobian of the loss function with respect to the
image.
It is a fast and reliable method to find adversarial exam-
ples, although not the most widely used for finding realistic
looking adversarials, as high-success rate attacks yield more
noticeable perturbations than other more advanced methods.
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Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Attack Method The Itera-
tive Fast Gradient Sign Method takes T gradient steps of
magnitude α = /T instead of a single step. It is also called
Basic Iterative Method (Kurakin et al., 2016) in ART and
does not apply clipping after each iteration(however, there
is an argument for that, which is the algorithm described in
(Kurakin et al., 2016)). The equations are:
xadv0 = x
xadvt+1 = x
adv
t + α ∗ sign(∇xJ(xadvt , ytrue))
where xadvt is the adversarial found at iteration t.
Carlini and Wagner Attack Method The Carlini and
Wagner (Carlini & Wagner, 2016) method is currently one
of the strongest adversarial attacks. It was used to break
defensive distillation(a method of defense that was able to
reduce the success rate of previous attacks’ ability to find
adversarial examples from 95% to 0.5%). It achieved suc-
cess rate of 100% on both distilled and undistilled networks
for all three norms of the attack. The attack solves the op-
timization problem of minimizing the distance D between
the original image and the adversarial:
minimize D(x, x+ µ)
subject to f(x+ µ) ≤ 0
(1)
The optimization function f is
f(x+µ) = max(max{Z(x+µ)i : i 6= t}−Z(x+µ)t,−k)
where Z is the softmax output for the most probable class
different from the targeted class.
The k parameter controls the confidence with which the mis-
classification occurs. The attack uses the Adam optimizer
which allows for the tuning of the learning rate. Several
other parameters are available in the frameworks, which did
not seem to affect the attack success as much as the learning
rate(most contributory) and the confidence constant(second
most contributory).
3. Experiments and Evaluation
A large body of research has so far concentrated on finding
attacks and parameters with high success rate for low
perturbations. These evaluations may sometimes find
adversarial examples within one pixel L-infinity distance
from the original image(i.e. each pixel of the adversarial is
within a value of one of the original image). Many papers
compare attacks by, for example, listing a small number
of L2/L-infinity norm thresholds for the perturbations and
reporting accuracy percentages.
Though useful for evaluation of minimal perturbations,
these comparisons are not universally practical due to the
wide-spread image formats using integer representation.
Converting an adversarially found numpy floating point
array to an image is not possible, except if very specific and
not widely spread floating point image formats, such as
.tiff are used. These formats provide high-quality images
and are usually employed in niche domains(e.g. X-ray
imaging). A majority of common formats such as the .png
and .jpg format use 8-bit integer representation for their
color channels and pixel values[0-255]. Many papers take
this into account and measure minimal perturbations from
images rounded to integer values, though some do not
mention it explicitly.
This means that until floating point image formats are
widely used, an attacker has to round the pixel values,
which could potentially overturn the adversarial training
process and make the prediction of the white-box-attacked
classifier correct again, which makes evaluation of minimal
perturbations not valuable in some cases. The effects of
rounding the values may vary. For this work, metrics were
gathered on valid images that were mapped back to their
original [0-255] ranges. In order to examine transferability
fairly, a fair metric is needed. An attack might be more
transferable than another just because it changes the image
more, not because the changes are necessarily better or
”stronger”. An initial idea for a fair metric was to pick
several thresholds for some L-norm distance from the
original image and compare the transferability across these
thresholds.
This is the method used by many works in the literature.
However, a problem with this is that the ranges of
perturbations found by different attacks can vary by orders
of magnitude, which makes picking appropriate thresholds
to evaluate transferability problematic. Table 1 shows
normalized MSE distances for iterations from runs for some
of the different tested attacking algorithms for a sample
image using the Foolbox. It can be seen that different
attacks start finding adversarials at different distances(first
entries of the table), some start to converge, and others take
different-sized steps. A way to amend this problem is to
restrict the comparison to a family of similar algorithms
which modify the image in comparable ranges. However,
this method is too restrictive in general as new attacks
emerge, and thresholds for existing attacks are difficult to
choose.
Another method is to let an attack run its course and then
post-process the adversarial image by clipping it to the
closest point on a ball of a given radius away from the
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Saliency Map Blended Noise DeepFool Iterative Gradient Contrast Reduction
6.07e-04 3.49e-02 7.96e-06 1.09e-03 9.48e-02
6.16e-04 3.50e-02 1.02e-05 1.24e-03 9.50e-02
6.20e-04 3.52e-02 1.04e-05 1.40e-03 9.52e-02
6.21e-04 3.54e-02 1.18e-05 1.54e-03 9.54e-02
6.22e-04 3.55e-02 1.19e-05 1.73e-03 9.56e-02
6.25e-04 3.57e-02 1.19e-05 1.87e-03 9.58e-02
6.29e-04 3.58e-02 1.19e-05 2.05e-03 9.60e-02
6.30e-04 3.60e-02 1.19e-05 2.22e-03 9.62e-02
6.34e-04 3.62e-02 1.19e-05 2.40e-03 9.63e-02
6.39e-04 3.63e-02 1.19e-05 2.57e-03 9.64e-02
6.44e-04 3.65e-02 1.19e-05 2.77e-03 9.66e-02
6.49e-04 3.67e-02 1.19e-05 2.96e-03 9.68e-02
6.54e-04 3.68e-02 1.19e-05 3.16e-03 9.69e-02
... ... ... ... ...
6.58e-02 9.43e-02 1.19e-05 9.62e-02 9.70e-02
6.58e-02 9.46e-02 1.19e-05 9.63e-02 9.72e-02
6.58e-02 9.48e-02 1.19e-05 9.64e-02 9.74e-02
6.58e-02 9.51e-02 1.19e-05 9.65e-02 9.76e-02
6.59e-02 9.54e-02 1.19e-05 9.67e-02 9.78e-02
6.59e-02 9.56e-02 1.19e-05 9.68e-02 9.80e-02
6.59e-02 9.59e-02 1.19e-05 9.70e-02 9.82e-02
6.59e-02 9.62e-02 1.19e-05 9.70e-02 9.84e-02
6.59e-02 9.64e-02 1.19e-05 9.72e-02 9.86e-02
Interrupted Interrupted Interrupted Interrupted Interrupted
Table 1. Normalized MSE for adversarials across iterations
original image. This method is how the experiments were
set up. For the experiments, a dataset of 496 images, all
classified correctly with 0.98 confidence or more than all
five classifiers, was composed. Images as far away from the
decision boundaries were preferred in order to discourage
the effectiveness of random attacks.
The images were ”trained” for the seven classifiers in
a white-box way using an untargeted attack(the attack
changes the image to any other class instead of a specific
target class). Then, each of the models was attacked in a
black-box manner by simply taking the accuracy of the
predictions of the classifiers for the clipped trained images.
The experiment setup and technical details are as follows.
The dataset was created by gathering five random classes of
images with a total of 497 images (about 100 images of each
class) which were passed through the VGG or Inception
preprocessing functions. They were center-cropped to
have dimensions of 224x224x3 and were ensured to have
correct and confident predictions for all five models after
the preprocessing(during the course of this work, the Keras
version was updated to not allow 224x224 images for the
Inception models, but only 299x299. Older Keras versions
work for this, e.g. 2.1.5).
For the training stage, the images were passed through the
preprocessing functions for the VGG or Inception models.
Then, the attacking algorithms were run, and were left
to ”wonder around”. After, reverse preprocessing was
performed, the images were clipped to a minimum pixel
value of 0, and maximum of 255, in case they were out of
the allowed range after the reverse processing operation(as
the API of the attacks did not allow for different color
channels to have different minimum and maximum values,
which is the case for the VGG preprocessed numpy arrays).
Then, the images were clipped again to different L-infinity
norm ranges, as described below. Finally, the images were
rounded to the nearest integer and results are gathered. The
clipping procedure used was numpy’s function ”clip”.
Using this methodology a strong attack which fools most
of the images in the source model had to be found right
after the preprocessing steps. Parameter search for the
attacks was done manually, due to slow training times that
discouraged standard parameter search procedures.
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Different L-infinity clipping ranges - 0, 5, 10, 15, until
150 (each pixel value of the adversarial must be within a
maximum of each of these values from the original image,
consult figs. 7, 8 and 9 for images of different noise levels)
were used in the presented results.
3.1. Attack Parameters
In this section we present the parameters and the toolboxes
used for the experiments. Parameters other than the men-
tioned ones were left to their default values. Table 2 shows
the different classifiers’ accuracies in percentages right after
the preprocessing and attack end, and before the postpro-
cessing operations described in the section 3.
3.1.1. FGSM ATTACK - ART
For the L-Infinity FGSM implementation, ART was used
with the parameter  = 100.
3.1.2. I-FGSM ATTACK - ART
The parameters used were a step size of 1, and number of
iterations of 100 to match FGSM’s distortion. The attack
optimizes L-Infinity as well.
3.1.3. CARLINI & WAGNER ATTACK - FOOLBOX
For this L2-norm version of the attack, Foolbox was used
with parameters max iterations = 100, learning rate = 7,
and confidence = 50. The rest of the parameters were left to
default at initial const = 1e− 2 and binary search steps =
5.
Classifier FGSM I-FGSM C&W
VGG16 0.0% 1.609% 0.0%
VGG19 0.6% 2.01% 0.0%
Inception V3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Xception 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Inception Resnet 2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
VGG Ensemble 0.0% 1.207% 0.0%
Inception Ensemble 0.0% 0.0% 0.603%
Table 2. Accuracy of the classifiers under different attacks before
postprocessing (smaller numbers indicate a more successful attack)
3.2. Visual Metrics Motivation
The results(after postprocessing) when using L-Infinity as a
metric for visual perturbation are shown in fig. 4. However,
since the L-Infinity metric is not indicative of noticeable
visual perturbation(for example, an adversarial which has
1 pixel distorted by a value of 100 is the same as an adver-
sarial which has all of its pixels distorted by a value of 100
under the L-Infinity metric), we aim to gather results more
correlated with human perception of noise levels. Therefore,
visual metrics other than L-Infinity were considered when
reorganizing the results for the L-Infinity-clipped images.
3.3. Visual Metrics
Three other metrics were considered to reorganise the L-
Infinity results in terms of metrics which are more correlated
with how human perceive images.
3.3.1. INCEPTION SCORE
The first tested visual metric was the Inception Score (IS),
first introduced in (Salimans et al., 2016). It serves as a
measure for the performance of Generative Adversarial Net-
works(GANs). The IS takes a list of images as input and
returns a score. The IS was calculated using the implementa-
tion available here3, where the lists of the clipped images of
the different various L-Infinity clipping ranges were passed
through the scoring function. After examination of the im-
ages, the perturbation for the clipping ranges appeared to be
gradually increasing.
However, there was no pattern to the IS(fig. 3). Therefore
the metric was not chosen to reorganize the results. The IS
is not typically used in the literature to measure the levels of
adversarial noise. We observe that this metric is ineffective
for this purpose.
3.3.2. MEAN ABSOLUTE DISTANCE (MAD)
Commonly used metrics in the literature to measure min-
imum perturbations of adversarial examples include the
Mean Squarred Distance(MSD) and Mean Absolute Dis-
tance(MAD). MAD was chosen as another potential metric
for reorganization of the results (fig. 3) and measures the
mean absolute difference between the clipped images of the
different maximum ranges and the originals.
3.3.3. STRUCTURAL SIMILARITY INDEX (SSIM)
The final metric tested was the SSIM(fig. 3) and can be
used to measure the quality degradation between 2 images,
commonly reported from 1(no degradation) to 0 or from
100 to 0. This measure has been mentioned in the image
analysis literature to correlate more with human perception
than MAD(Wang et al., 2004).
Therefore, it was chosen for reorganization of the results(fig.
6). Scikit-image was used for the calculation of the SSIM.
For the different clipping ranges, the mean SSIM between
the adversarial images, and their corresponding originals
was calculated.
3https://github.com/tsc2017/Inception-Score
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(a) VGG16 (b) VGG19 (c) Inception V3 (d) Xception
(e) Inception Resnet 2 (f) VGG Ensemble (g) Inception Ensemble
(h) VGG16 (i) VGG19 (j) Inception V3 (k) Xception
(l) Inception Resnet 2 (m) VGG Ensemble (n) Inception Ensemble
(o) VGG16 (p) VGG19 (q) Inception V3 (r) Xception
(s) Inception Resnet 2 (t) VGG Ensemble (u) Inception Ensemble
Figure 4. Performance of every classifier when attacked by each of the 7 classifiers, for all 3 attacks, under the L-Infinity metric. For
example, (a) shows the defensive accuracy of VGG16 when attacked by clipped adversarial images created by all 7 classifiers, using the
FGSM attack(title of plot signifies the defending classifier and the used attack).
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Figure 3. The three visual metrics considered for the reorganization
of results - Inception Score of the adversarials of varying clip
strengths(top), Average Mean Absolute Distance of adversarials
of varying clip strengths from the original images(middle), and
Average Structural Similarity Index of adversarials of varying clip
strengths from the originals(bottom).
3.4. Discussion
Using SSIM analysis(fig. 6) we are able to gather results
which are more correlated with human perception than
when using the L-Infinity metric. However, due to the
fact that the pixels of an image are changed in uniform
ranges(figs. 7, 8 and 9), the L-Infinity plots and the SSIM
plots are consistent with each other, although differences
in performances are more pronounced in the SSIM plots.
When assessing attacks such as the Single-Pixel attack(Su
et al., 2017) or ”local” attacks, differences between the
L-Infinity and SSIM results are more substantial. SSIM is
the superior method of evaluation of adversarial attacks to
the L-Infinity measure in the general case. However, it is
still weak in evaluating certain classes of attacks such as
adversarial scaling or rotations.
We find that, with the exception of the ensembles, for
all attacks, similar architectures have similar ”fooling”
capacities. The adversarials found by similar architectures
appear very similar as well.
For the FGSM attack, the most powerful and transferable
model is the VGG-Ensemble, followed by VGG19/16, the
Inception Ensemble, Inception Resnet V2, and Inception
V3 and Xception respectively. For the I-FGSM attack, the
VGG-Ensemble is the most transferable as well for small
perturbations. However, due to its quick convergence it is
unable to change the image enough to to generalize to the
Inception family for larger ranges of perturbation. After the
VGG Ensemble, the remaining most transferable models
are VGG19, VGG16, followed by the Inception family. We
observe that using an ensemble of Inception models does
not improve the success of the attack for both the Inception
and the VGG models. For C&W with LR=7, the ensembles
perform the worst of all models. VGG19 and 16 are again
the top performing models, followed by Inception Resnet
V2, Xception and Inception V3.
In order to compare the ”best-case” transferability across
the attacks, we present the average transferability of the
strongest attacking model for each attack across all models,
including the source.
In order to compare the average-case transferability, results
are averaged across the other models as well, and the aver-
aged results are averaged over each attack. The SSIM ranges
of the models for each attack are averaged as well:
Figure 5. Comparison of the transferability of the three attacks
under the chosen parameters
4. Conclusion
Transferable adversarial examples are a potential risk to a
variety of applications employing machine learning meth-
ods by using the examples created using a local model to
attack a remote service. In this work we evaluate the trans-
ferability of adversarial examples using the setting of strong
untargeted attacks for the source models, which introduce
high visual perturbation to the images. We measure the ac-
curacy of the classifications of the source and target models
using different sets of L-Infinity clipped images. The results
are presented with respect to both L-Infinity, and SSIM as
metrics for visual perturbation. We find that Inception Score
is not a reliable way of measuring the quality of adversarial
images.We observe that for all attacks, the VGG models are
a stronger attacker than the Inception models, which is con-
sistent with findings in the literature. Moreover, ensembles
have been used before in the Clarifai.com black-box attack
with high success rate(Liu et al., 2016). We find that using
ensembles of parallel models with averaged predictions does
not improve the attack success for all attack methods with
an arbitrary parameter setting for the attack. The presented
method for evaluation of transferability is not exhaustive,
but significantly reduces the search space of possible param-
eters for the attacks by restricting them to only those which
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(a) VGG16 (b) VGG19 (c) Inception V3 (d) Xception
(e) Inception Resnet 2 (f) VGG Ensemble (g) Inception Ensemble
(h) VGG16 (i) VGG19 (j) Inception V3 (k) Xception
(l) Inception Resnet 2 (m) VGG Ensemble (n) Inception Ensemble
(o) VGG16 (p) VGG19 (q) Inception V3 (r) Xception
(s) Inception Resnet 2 (t) VGG Ensemble (u) Inception Ensemble
Figure 6. Performance of every classifier when attacked by each of the 7 classifiers, for all 3 attacks, using SSIM to calibrate the x-axis as
metric for visual perturbation. For example, (a) shows the defensive accuracy of VGG16 when attacked by clipped adversarial images
created by all 7 classifiers, using the FGSM attack(title of plot signifies the defending classifier and the used attack).
Measuring the Transferability of Adversarial Examples
make the source misclassify most of the images, without
worrying about high visual perturbation, which is amended
by the clipping mechanism. Evaluating the algorithms in the
presented way could lead to a more systematic and quantifi-
able way to compare attack tranferability than the methods
currently used in the literature. More research is needed in
finding ways to evaluate transferability in a consistent and
fair manner.
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Appendix
Original images Clip range - 10, avg. transferability - 49%
Clip range - 20, avg. transferability - 63% Clip range - 30, avg. transferability - 71%
Clip range - 40, avg. transferability - 77% Clip range - 50, avg. transferability - 83%
Clip range - 60, avg. transferability - 87% Clip range - 70, avg. transferability - 90%
Figure 7. Images for the FGSM attack trained on the VGG-Ensemble of different L-Infinity clipping ranges and the average transferabil-
ity(rounded) of these ranges across all models, including the source
Appendix
Original images Clip range - 10, avg. transferability - 48%
Clip range - 20, avg. transferability - 70% Clip range - 30, avg. transferability - 81%
Clip range - 40, avg. transferability - 86% Clip range - 50, avg. transferability - 88%
Clip range - 60, avg. transferability - 89% Clip range - 70, avg. transferability - 89%
Figure 8. Images for the I-FGSM attack trained on the VGG19 nework of different L-Infinity clipping ranges and the average transferabil-
ity(rounded) of these ranges across all models, including the source
Appendix
Original images Clip range - 10, avg. transferability - 48%
Clip range - 20, avg. transferability - 62% Clip range - 62%, avg. transferability - 71%
Clip range - 40, avg. transferability - 77% Clip range - 50, avg. transferability - 81%
Clip range - 60, avg. transferability - 85% Clip range - 70, avg. transferability - 88%
Figure 9. Images for the C&W attack with LR=7, trained on the VGG19 network of different L-Infinity clipping ranges and the average
transferability(rounded) of these ranges across all models, including the source
